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ABSTRACT:  The design of a tax system is a daunting task. Economies have become 
increasingly complex, which makes the design of taxes has to take into account 
behavioral taxpayers' responses - including mobility -, but also tax planning issues. 
Additionally, increasing inequality trends put more pressure on design. This complex 
framework increases the need of complete and constantly updated information about the 
functioning of the system to carry out welfare-enhancing reforms and having stable 
sources of public funding. It seems now the moment the Spanish tax system takes 
advantage of all sources of information to undertake a necessary reform. For this 
ambitious purpose, we aim at providing a novel source of information: the (objective) 
opinion of tax professionals. From a survey all over Spain, tax professionals unanimously 
conclude the current tax system is unfair, while the main inefficiencies, rather than due to 
traditional responses, come out as a consequence of tax planning and tax mobility. We 
hope the complete results of the survey are a useful source of information.   
 
MAIN RESULT: From their daily-practice, tax professionals might provide lots of insights into 
the functioning of a tax system. We have conducted a survey among them regarding the 
Spanish Tax System (2012); they unanimously conclude the current one is unfair, while the 
main inefficiencies, rather than due to traditional responses, come out as a consequence of tax 
planning and tax mobility. 
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1. Introduction 
The Spanish tax system, as any tax system, is far from being a perfect one made of fair, 
efficient and simple taxes, perfectly coordinated, and that yield enough revenue to 
finance public expenditure. In practice, there is not a perfect tax system such that 
economic analysis mainly concentrates on how taxes should be levied to enhance 
economic efficiency and to promote a fair distribution of income. Because, despite there 
are not perfect systems, “the way in which these systems are designed matters 
enormously to economic welfare” (Mirrlees et al., 2011, p. 1). 
Economic theory and empirical research are useful tools for assessing the impact of 
taxes on economic agent’s behavior and on the economy as a whole. For instance, 
public finance has traditionally shown that the corporate tax (CT) and the personal 
income tax (PIT) should equally levy economic activities so the tax system makes no 
difference with respect to their legal structure (e.g., Crawford and Freedman, 2010). 
Regardless the firm is incorporated or not, the tax treatment should be the same. A 
similar situation happens as far as businesses’ financial decisions are concerned. 
Payments of interests are deductible for the taxable base of the CT, but the opportunity 
cost of equity finance is not, which provokes a bias towards debt financing that might 
have deepened the recent financial crisis (e.g. Slemrod, 2009; and Keen et al., 2010). 
Another interesting example is the Value Added Tax (VAT). It has widely been adopted 
as a general sales tax mainly because has better compliance properties than a retail sales 
tax and it is clearly superior compared to consumption taxes on producers or 
wholesalers (Cnossen, 1998). However, in the European Union, the cradle of the tax, 
VAT is heavily criticized by academics due to numerous exemptions, reduced rates and 
special schemes that much complicate the tax and cause distortions. In fact, the very 
European Union in 2010 issued a Green Paper on the future of VAT under the title 
“Towards a simpler, more robust and efficient VAT”. 
These three examples, pointed out by the academic literature among others, show that 
better designed taxes can improve tax systems and so that there is scope for more 
equitable, efficient and simple tax systems. But, what is the opinion of tax professionals, 
that is, of those working in the private sector and that advice people and businesses in 
their tax obligations1? They play an important role in the application of tax systems, 
particularly in the Spanish tax system where almost all taxes work under self-
assessment schemes, that is, taxpayers assess the rule and calculate tax liabilities2. Do 
they think the system is really fair? Is it really efficient? Is it really simple or rather 
complex, which in turn is a source of inequity and distortions? All in all, according to 
their real practice, is there an objective need to reform the whole tax system or any 
particular tax? These are some of the many questions that we raise in a survey among 
tax professionals working all over Spain in collaboration with the two most important 
professional associations in the field of taxation. From the academia, researchers can 
easily identify distortions (for example, marginal tax rates on labor income, differential 
                                                          
1 In the literature we find examples of surveys sent to tax professionals to know their opinions about tax 
policy. For instance, the American National Tax Association sent a survey in 1994 to their members, 
including a subset of a survey questions already given to senior public finance professors in 1934 (see 
Slemrod, 1994). More recently, in 2013, another tax policy survey was distributed to their member, 
although their results have not been published yet. 
2 This is probably the main reason why Spain has the lowest ratio citizens / tax administration employees 
within the European Union (27). According to Onrubia (2013), in 2009 there were in Spain 1,928 citizens 
per tax administration employee. The average value for the EU (15) was 966 and for the EU (27) 896.  
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fiscal treatment of financial costs in the CT or differential tax rates on consumption 
depending on the good or service), but do they cause a change in the behavior of 
agents? Only if this is so, there will be efficiency losses. That can be empirically tested 
by means of econometric analyses, which usually, though, require strong identification 
assumptions. In this paper, we adopt another approach, complementary to the empirical 
one, which bases on asking tax professionals, among others, whether taxes cause 
changes of behavior or whether there is tax planning that would tend to lower the tax 
revenue potential and also cause inequity as long as planning is concentrated on rich 
taxpayers. This approach allows to obtain relevant information not only for a single tax, 
but will allow us to get a complete picture of the Spanish current tax system, and about 
different dimensions (efficiency, equity or tax planning). 
Tax advisers have a practical knowledge of taxation, for instance, of complicated tax 
avoidance schemes or simpler tax planning practices designed to reduce the final tax 
invoice. Application issues are often very important as legal loopholes or different legal 
options can significantly alter the final amount to pay and, therefore, the real effect of 
taxes. Nowadays, tax legislation runs to over thousands of pages becoming only 
comprehensible to specialists, whereas average citizens and even economists might get 
tangled. For that reason, it is important to know their opinions about equity, efficiency 
and tax planning when assessing a tax system. As we will latter comment, the results 
show that the Spanish tax system is considered to be regressive, as the greatest burden 
does not fall on rich individuals, but on medium and working-class individuals; 
inefficient, mainly due to tax planning and tax avoidance schemes, as well as mobility 
of tax bases; and increasing complex, mostly due to endogenous factors of the system. 
On the whole, the conclusion is that there is a need for a global reform of the tax 
system. We share Slemrod's hope when summarizing the results of a similar survey 
conducted in 1994 by the National Tax Association3 among American tax professionals: 
They “will be of interest to both tax professionals and policymakers, and will stimulate 
a discussion of the policies themselves” (Slemrod, 1994, p. 145), and we add with the 
aim of improving the system.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we analyze some 
issues of the Spanish tax system, albeit common in other countries, which are 
particularly relevant as far as efficiency, equity and taxing planning are concerned. In 
section 3, we explain the survey and the main results and we end with some 
conclusions. 
 
2. Efficiency, equity and tax planning issues 
Tax systems are usually the result of often conflicting objectives and compromises, as it 
is not possible to meet all of them at the same time. For instance, a lump sum tax is 
efficient, but it is not fair as everyone would pay the same regardless his ability to pay. 
A comprehensive income tax with a very progressive tax schedule can be fair, but high 
marginal tax rates can be very inefficient as they create economic distortions due to 
changes in people’s behavior. There is a trade-off between equity and efficiency, which 
can totally alter the final effect of a measure. For instance, higher marginal rates in the 
PIT, as Spain introduced in 2011 “in order to provide greater fairness to the tax”4, could 
                                                          
3 See fn. 1. 
4 Preamble of Act 39/2010 that increased rates. 
3
 
 
foster the progressivity of the tax, but if well-advised richest taxpayers can avoid higher 
marginal rates through tax avoidance schemes or tax planning activities, the final result 
as far as equity is concerned can be very different. Therefore, the final outcome depends 
very much on the rule of the whole tax system, not only of a particular tax, and also on 
tax enforcement5.  
But there are not only trade-offs between equity and efficiency in the PIT, because often 
one can observe conflicts among other objectives and with respect to other taxes. 
Exemptions and reduced tax rates in the VAT are clear examples. Generally based on 
social grounds, they complicate the tax, making more difficult both compliance for 
taxpayers and enforcement for tax administration, and what is worse it seems that they 
are a weak instrument to help the less well-off (Crawford, et al., 2010). In addition, they 
go against neutrality of VAT, which then can distort businesses’ decisions.  
We next analyze some of these conflicting situations in the current Spanish tax system, 
also common in other countries, particularly taking into account issues related to 
efficiency, equity and taxing planning.  
 
2.1 Tax schedules and tax bases in the personal income tax and corporate tax 
It is important to jointly assess PIT and CT as both levy income, which may allow to 
transfer income from one tax to another. Statutory tax rates are a key issue of any tax 
and usually concentrate much attention in public opinion, particularly top marginal tax 
rates of the PIT even though they usually levy a small proportion of taxpayers. In the 
2011 Spanish tax, only 3.52 % of taxpayers reported a general tax income greater than 
60,000 euros, which means that the overall majority of individuals are in the first four 
brackets of the tax schedule. In other words, only a very small proportion pays the four 
top marginal tax rates (from 46.9% to 56%, depending on the region)6. On the other 
side, the statutory tax rate in CT is 30%, although most incorporated firms enjoy 25% 
tax rate for the first 300,000 euros of profits. Therefore, a difference of up to 30 
perceptual points, that already reaches 20 points from income slightly greater than 
53.000 euros. Thus, in Spain, but also in many other countries, an owner of an 
unincorporated firm has the opportunity to incorporate his activity with the aim of 
reducing his tax liability. Indeed, De Mooij and Nicodème (2008) explore income 
shifting from the personal toward the corporate tax base for 17 European countries 
between 1997 and 2003. And their results suggest that the tax gap between personal and 
corporate tax rates exerts a signiﬁcant positive effect on the degree of incorporation as 
between 10% and 17% of corporate tax revenue can be attributed to income shifting7. 
The literature reminds us the ideal would be that the legal form of a business should 
make no difference to its tax treatment (e.g. Crawford and Freedman, 2010).  
                                                          
5 Diamond and Saez (2011) defend that optimal top tax rate in the PIT should be modified when: tax 
avoidance channels produce changes in tax revenue in other periods or other tax bases; and also when tax 
avoidance or evasion can be reduced through base broadening and tax enforcement. Hence, they obtain 
that very high earners should be subject to rising marginal rates (and higher than current U.S. rates) as a 
policy recommendation.  
6 Although their tax liabilities account for approximately 33% of all revenue yielded. 
7 In an empirical study for Spain, Domínguez Barrero et al. (2005) suggest that differences between 
personal and corporate taxes are not significant as far as the incorporating decision is concerned, although 
the same authors are cautious about the results due to the reduced number of observations. 
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In fact, this is one of the aims of the dual tax that Nordic countries apply since the early 
nineties, where all capital income, regardless the specific kind of income and if it is 
obtained by an individual or by a corporation, is taxed at the same reduced flat rate 
(Cnossen, 1999). This enhances neutrality as all capital income is levied homogenously, 
but at the same time improves vertical equity, as tax planning through incorporating 
business is mainly concentrated on richest individuals (Sorensen, 1994). However, 
Spain and most EU countries do not have a pure dual income tax, whereby smaller tax 
rates in CT may increase tax distortions. The average statutory tax rate of the CT in the 
EU (27) has fallen since the beginning of the XXI century (from an average of 31.9 in 
2000 to 23.9 in 2009), although the top marginal rate of the PIT also fell (from an 
average of 44.8 in 2000 to 37.2 in 20098). Both trends end with the economic crisis once 
countries introduce consolidation measures. Nevertheless, the change is not the same. 
While the CT statutory rate remains stable since 2010 (around 23.2%), the top marginal 
PIT rate has been increased in 13 out of 27 EU states (the average top marginal rate has 
risen to 38.9 in 2013). This is very true in Spain, where top marginal PIT rates have 
moved from 43% in 2010 to 56% since 2012. The wider the gap between CT and PIT 
rates, the more attractive is incorporating activities. Professional opinions, or should 
rather say, the knowledge of professional of daily tax practices can cast light on the 
incorporation of activities.  
In addition to similar tax schedules, a neutral treatment of economic activities requires 
taxable income is assessed in a similar way in both PIT and in CT. However, the 
Spanish PIT foresees the objective estimation for small businesses according to the so-
called “signs, indexes and modules”. Under this system, taxpayers can assess their 
taxable income taking into account different variables that the rule sets and which vary 
depending on the specific economic activity; for instance, number of employees, 
number of self-employed, surface or electric energy. Hence, taxpayers pay the tax 
regardless their real profits. The opinion among scholars is almost unanimous: the 
system is inefficient, as similar businesses may pay very different taxes depending on 
its legal structure (incorporated or not). But in addition the system is considered to be 
unfair, rather complex and even becomes a source of tax fraud. Consequently, it 
requires a complete overhaul (e.g., Paredes (2010), Rubio and Romero (2013), Esteller-
Moré and Durán-Cabré (2013))9. Tax advisers seem to share the same opinion10.  
 
2.2 Corporate tax and efficiency on businesses’ financial decisions 
Under most countries’ CT, firms have traditionally deducted payments of interest from 
taxable base, although are not allowed to deduct the opportunity cost of equity finance. 
The rule therefore builds a bias towards debt financing. With the arrival of the crisis, 
more attention has been paid on the effect of CT on the financial decisions of 
businesses. Empirical studies (e.g. Slemrod, 2009; Keen et al., 2010) show that this 
distortion was not a major cause of the financial crisis, but by contributing to the 
excessive level of leverage might have deepened it.  
                                                          
8 Source Taxation Trends in the European Union, 2013 ed., Eurostat. 
9 More than 50 leading academics, researchers and specialists in taxation identify the complete overhaul 
of the objective estimation as one of the ten key points for a real tax reform in Spain (Esteller-Moré and 
Durán Cabré, 2013). 
10 As far as tax fraud is concerned, a particularly interesting result of the survey is that from their 
experience 64% of professionals fully agree and 24% rather agree with the following statement: “The 
objective estimation by modules makes tax fraud easier in the PIT and other taxes of the tax system”. 
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There are two main proposals in the literature to eliminate this distortion11. On the one 
hand, the Comprehensive Business Income Tax (CBIT), which does not allow to deduct 
payments of interest. Under this system, tax revenues rise, since then tax profits become 
bigger; and the level of investment might go down as the user cost of capital increases. 
On the other hand, the Allowance for Corporate Equity (ACE), which introduces an 
allowance for the cost of equity finance. Various forms of the ACE tax have been used, 
for instance, in Belgium and Italy, but other countries, such as Germany, France or 
United Kingdom, have limited the deductibility of interest from taxable income. Spain 
joined this latter group in 2012, as interest payments are deductible up to one million of 
euros, or 30% of profits when this latter amount is larger than the former. Rather than 
improving efficiency in the treatment of debt and equity, the aim of the new limitation 
is to raise more revenue fighting against international debt shifting that multinationals 
develop to take profit of different tax rates among countries12.  
Consequently, there is still a bias towards debt financing in the Spanish CT, although 
smaller due to the limitation on the deduction of interest. Nonetheless, the limit is 
probably binding only for big companies, as it is unlikely that small and medium size 
companies pay interests above one million of euros. On the other hand, small and 
medium size companies face more financing constraints, because financial institutions 
requires them more guarantees and generally have less financial information (Albi, 
2013). Therefore, the bias towards debt may also depend on the size of firms. Again, tax 
advisers' experience can cast light on it. 
 
2.3. Inheritance and gift tax, the role of regions and equity  
Most economies raise relatively little revenue from inheritance and gift taxes. 
Furthermore, most individuals would never pay the tax13. Nonetheless, the inheritance 
and gift tax (IGT) generates big attention from the public opinion and the mass media, 
and often becomes the subject of intense political debate.  
IGT is frequently justified on the grounds of fairness. The distribution of wealth is more 
unequal than the distribution of income and has become even more unequal in recent 
years (Piketty and Zucman, 2013). Supporters of the tax defense that redistribution of 
wealth should be an objective of the tax system, and therefore levying inheritances is an 
efficient means to improve wealth distribution. If that is true, the structure of the tax 
should be consistent with that aim. Nonetheless, this is not always the case, as the tax 
law often creates loopholes that are used by people to avoid or significantly reduce the 
tax bill. If wealthy well-advised taxpayers are those that take most advantage of them, it 
produces doubts about the fairness of the IGT as equivalent wealth transfers pay very 
different amounts of tax depending on its composition (Durán-Cabré and Esteller-Moré, 
2014).  
In Spain, for instance, business assets can obtain at least 95% deduction when assessing 
taxable wealth. Furthermore, once regions (so-called Autonomous Communities (ACs)) 
                                                          
11 Jérez and Picos (2012) estimate the effects that the application of this type of reforms would have in 
Spain. 
12 Huizinga et al. (2008) find that a firm's leverage depends on national tax rates as well as international 
tax rate differences. Moreover, international debt shifting is shown to reflect a subsidiary's tax rates, 
differences vis-à-vis the parent firm as well as vis-à-vis other foreign subsidiaries. 
13 For instance, only 2% of Americans pay the tax (Boadway et al., 2009). 
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had legal power, many introduced almost full exemption of transfers to spouse and 
children. In 2012, 11 out of the 17 communities almost do not levy theses inheritances, 
which generates big pressures to do the same on those still taxing them14. The 
inheritance tax is due according to the residence principle of the deceased, regardless 
where the heirs live. Having second houses in other regions is not unusual for those who 
expect to transfer their wealth to their heirs, which makes easier to change the official 
place of residence. Although the tax law tries to avoid these changes by requiring a five-
year gap before the new region’s rule becomes applicable, fighting against tax 
avoidance practices is not easy. Savings from changing the residence can be substantial, 
as the tax due goes from a big amount to almost nothing15. In addition, the gift tax of 
estates is due to the region where the estate is located, which also makes easier tax 
planning activities to avoid in the future the inheritance tax without any official change 
in the place of residence. In 2012, 6 regions did not levy gifts made by the donors to 
their spouses or children. 
Table 1 shows some illustrative examples for two regions, Andalusia, the most 
populated AC of Spain, and Madrid. Same value transfers in the same AC are taxed in a 
very different way, depending both on the type of property (eligible for permanent 
residence or business assets deductions) and on the relationship with the deceased 
(columns 1 and 2). But in addition, tax liabilities are very different depending on which 
region levies the transmission (column 3). These important differences make (relatively) 
smart tax planning very profitable, and so tax advisers play an important role. 
[TABLE 1] 
 
2.4 VAT: neutral for business and equitable for citizens?  
VAT represents one of the pillars of present-day tax systems and despite being a 
relatively new tax it has been rapidly adopted thanks to its supposed advantages. While 
the tax was only first levied in France in 1954, during the final third of the last century it 
was rapidly adopted, so that today it is charged in more than 150 countries16. Three 
main reasons can explain its rapid generalization: globalization makes easier to 
disseminate ideas, which also holds for taxation; VAT is neutral in its impact on 
international trade, since the tax due remains clearly separate from the tax base, and so 
applying the destination principle VAT does not affect the relative prices of products; 
and it can raise a significant amount of revenue in a rather efficient way (OECD; 2011). 
However, the Spanish and the EU’s VAT systems are heavily criticized by academics 
and, as we shall see, by professional tax consultants on the grounds of their complex 
and distorting regulations. 
                                                          
14 The Spanish press headlines on these issues are symptomatic of the situation. For instance, “La 
competencia fiscal autonómica”, El Periódico 24/10/2007; “La guerra fiscal entre comunidades amenaza 
el tributo sobre las herencias”, El País 06/05/2007; “Imposición autonómica y voto con los pies”, 
Expansión 22/03/2011; and “Grandes bufetes eligen sitios fuera de Cataluña y Andalucía para sus 
clientes”, Expansión 05/07/2007. 
15 Generally, 34% marginal rate is applied from 800,000 euros of taxable wealth, but tax liability can be 
increased between 20% and 240% depending on the relationship with the deceased and the previous 
wealth of the heir. 
16 Although the tax had been first proposed in the 1920s by a German businessman, Wilhelm von 
Siemens, the tax was first introduced in France 1954 thanks to the tax inspector, Maurice Lauré, typically 
considered to be the father of VAT (Owen et al., 2011).  
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Indeed, VAT is a harmonized tax within the European Union, being its basic framework 
outlined in regulations that date back to 1977 (referred to as the Sixth Directive), when 
the European Economic Community comprised just nine Member States and the 
economic and social reality was very different from that which prevails today. 
Moreover, the philosophy guiding these first regulations was the desire to uphold the 
status quo, which has given rise to numerous exemptions, reduced rates and special 
schemes that greatly complicate the tax (Cnossen, 2003). Clearly, the economic 
situation has changed significantly in the intervening years, but VAT has remained 
unchanged, owing to a situation of inertia, and the inherent difficulties in changing the 
regulations governing any tax, which in this case would require the unanimous 
agreement of all Member States. And, now, we are dealing with 28 versions of the 
status quo! (Durán-Cabré and Esteller-Moré, 2013).  
For socio-economic reasons, certain activities of general interest (such as hospital and 
medical care, goods and services linked to welfare and social security work, school and 
university education and certain cultural services) are exempted. However, when the 
supply of goods or services is exempt, the supplier cannot deduct the VAT on 
purchases, which means that ‘hidden’ VAT remains included in the price paid by the 
purchaser. This has important implications as VAT becomes no neutral for businesses 
leading to distortions of production patterns17, to distortions on international trade and 
to more expensive prices to businesses while final consumers pay cheaper prices18. 
Furthermore, exemptions have a revenue cost, increase both compliance costs to 
businesses and administrative costs to governments as well as litigation19 (Durán-Cabré, 
2013). 
Another source of distortion and complexity is the existence of reduced and super-
reduced rates, based on redistribute grounds20. These rates may be applied, when a 
country so decides, solely to a closed list of goods and services previously identified by 
the EU directive. In proportion, reduced rates of VAT benefit more poor households 
according to an empirical study for nine European countries21. Nonetheless, on average, 
richer households gain more in absolute cash terms, which points to the limitation of 
using VAT to redistribute. Indeed, if the savings of a Spanish family in the lowest decile 
(based on family spending, the variable that best represents their welfare) amount on 
average to 444 euros, the savings of families in the highest decile reach 1,831 euros 
(Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2011b). The answer to the question if reduced rates ensure 
that the tax is more equitable by being applied to staple goods is not clear. 
Since 2008, and the onset of the crisis, 16 of the 27 EU countries have increased their 
standard VAT rate, so that overall it has been increased a total of 32 times. Spain 
                                                          
17 The effective tax rate entailed by exemption depends on the share of total value that is added before the 
exempt link in the supply chain. This share is not fixed and a firm can minimize it by supply, for instance, 
their own technical support and cleaning services, rather than contract them out.  
18 For instance, this happens with financial services, which are VAT-exempt and consequently under-
taxed to households and over-taxed to businesses. Two common complaints are that it has been too cheap 
and easy for households to borrow, but too expensive and difficult for businesses to obtain finance. VAT 
exemption contributes to both of these (Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2011a). 
19 The lack of clear rules leads to litigation, as the final scope of exemptions is often set by the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (European Commission, 2010).  
20 From the optimal taxation theory, Mankiw et al. (2009) recommends that taxes on goods and services 
should avoid intermediate goods and be uniform across final goods. However, Diamond and Saez (2011) 
defend that some variation is well justified, although limiting variation is appropriate. 
21 These are Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Spain and the United Kingdom. 
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provides a clear example of this situation, having increased the overall rate by more 
than 30% during this time. Consequently, it seems reasonable to think that VAT 
revenues are set to rise considerably in the future, especially once the level of 
consumption recovers from the sharp drop it has suffered. Accordingly, the 
aforementioned problems derived from a defective design of the tax can only be 
worsened in the future.  
 
3. A Survey among the Tax Professionals regarding the Spanish Tax System 
In 2012, we conducted a survey among tax professionals working all over Spain. The 
aim of the survey was contrasting to what extent the academic assessment of the tax 
system is in accordance with the opinion of the professionals. What do we mean by 
opinion? We are not interested in inferring their individual preferences about the 
distribution of taxes or the level of taxation, but about the functioning of the tax system 
given their daily professional practice. Even so, this opinion might be biased, for 
example, according to the territory where they mostly work (as there might be 
differences in the legal definition of taxes and in their very administration across 
Spanish regions) or according to the “size” of the firm they work for (as, for example, 
the type of customers, and so the type of cases, might differ between small and big 
consultancy firms). We will try to control for this potential biases, as we will next show. 
We distributed the survey among tax professionals through the two most important 
Spanish professional associations in the field of taxation, “Asociación Española de 
Asesores Fiscales” and ”Registro de Economistas Asesores Fiscales”; in any case, in the 
survey it was clearly stated that our research institute – Institut d’Economia de 
Barcelona (IEB)  – was in charge of its design and exploitation. The responses were 
anonymous and were submitted on-line (www.EncuestaFacil.com); the IP address 
served as a filter to avoid duplication of responses through a given computer. We got 
272 responses22. Apart from those concerning the tax system, we also included 
questions about the personal characteristics of the respondent (sex, age, level of studies 
and years of experience) and those directly related to the firm in which she works 
(geographical location, number of workers and labor status). These responses should be 
useful as to (try to) control for potential biases in the responses.  
The content of the survey was designed in such a way we could get information about 
the relevance of distortions – identified from the academic literature – caused by taxes, 
and most important, whether they provoke changes of behavior (including mobility) and 
practices of avoidance23, that is, an assessment of the efficiency of the system. In 
theory, the more equitable (progressive), the less efficiency is a tax system, although 
distortions are not only provoked by progressive rates. We will check whether this is so.  
 
3.1. Equity of the Spanish Tax System 
Regarding the equity dimension, we posited the following simple question: Do you 
                                                          
22 The whole set of results of the survey is available at 
https://www.dropbox.com/s/p65ghdozhvmtjz2/Survey_tax_professionals.xlsx 
23 In any case, as Saez, Slemrod and Grietz (2012) argue all of them embody efficiency costs.  
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think rich people are those who pay the greatest share of taxes, or instead, medium and 
working-class people do so?
24
 The response was overwhelmingly: 93.4% consider the 
greatest burden of taxes falls on medium and working-class individuals, 4.4% consider 
it falls on rich individuals, while 2.2% do not know how to answer. Hence, only 4.4% of 
the respondents think richest taxpayers bear the greatest share of the Spanish (see fn. 
22).   
Therefore, according to the experience of the professionals, the Spanish tax system as 
a whole is regressive. There is so little variation that a regression analysis of the 
responses does not allow us to infer any particular bias.  
 
3.2. Efficiency of the Spanish Tax System 
While not all taxes aim for equity, certainly it is socially desirable that each tax is 
efficient. That is why, in order to infer the opinion of tax professionals regarding 
efficiency, we identify several potential distortions by tax; in particular, we do so for the 
CT, the PIT and the VAT.  
With respect to the CT, we ask whether this tax has an impact on the following 
decisions: 
- Source of financing (own resources vs. external resources) 
- Type of physical investment (according to the pattern of depreciation fiscally 
deductible) 
- Country where to invest (according to the differences in the level of tax rates) 
- Legal structure of a business (incorporated vs. unincorporated) 
- Planning to reduce the tax burden (avoidance)  
Hence, questions include classical changes of behavior (financing, investment or legal 
structure), or even considering mobility (country), but also we ask about the possibility 
of tax avoidance (planning). Business decisions are considered separately. In all cases, 
and this applies to other taxes as well, the responses can be: “fully disagree” (being the 
response coded as 1), “partially agree” (coded=2), “rather agree” (coded=3), or “fully 
agree” (coded=4).  
For the PIT, we ask about the following possible distortions: 
- Spanish region of residence (mobility) 
- Purchasing of housing vs. renting (due to the tax credit for first dwellings) 
- Type of assets in which to invest personal savings 
- Legal structure of a business (incorporated vs. unincorporated) 
 
And regarding the VAT, in general, we ask whether this is a neutral tax with respect to 
firm decisions. 
We present the results in Table 2 ordered from more agreement about the distortion 
(i.e., close to 4) to less agreement (close to 1). First, with the exception of the VAT, all 
means are above 2, which at least implies partial agreement. Second, with the exception 
                                                          
24 In Spanish, the survey question reads as follows: “¿Cree que los más ricos son los que más contribuyen, 
o son las clases medias y trabajadoras?”. 
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of PIT_Housing, the most important distortions are related either to avoidance 
(PIT_Legal Structure, CT_Planning, CT_Legal Structure) or to mobility (CT_Country 
and PIT_Residence). The former distortions are probably due to the complexity of the 
tax system that creates loopholes, while the second are related to the particular tax 
decentralization process occurred in Spain but also to the general phenomena of 
globalization, as both facilitate the mobility of taxable factors.  
[TABLE 2] 
All in all, it is difficult to conclude how (in)efficient the Spanish tax system is. But, just 
like the abolition of the PIT tax credit for first-dwellings in 2013, the survey points to 
the need of reforming the tax system. First, impeding or making it difficult tax 
avoidance schemes (probably, most importantly, aligning as we already said in section 
2 the tax levels in PIT and CT). Second, reducing the potential negative consequences 
of tax decentralization within Spain (potentially addressable), but also far away from 
our frontiers (much less addressable without international cooperation).  
Interestingly, in contrast with the assessment obtained for equity, as far as efficiency is 
concerned we have some variation to exploit the responses trying to infer any potential 
bias, that is, any particular pattern behind the opinions given by the professionals. In 
order to exploit it, in Table 3, we show the OLS25 results for each distortion, where the 
independent variables are those previously identified (personal characteristics of the 
respondent and those directly related to the firm where she works) and remain the same 
for each regression.  
[TABLE 3] 
From the estimates shown in Table 3, there is nothing remarkable. As a general result, 
though, it is curious – though we lack a proper economic interpretation – that the older 
the respondent, the more likely she is, let’s say, skeptical about the relevance of the 
distortions. And as a particular result, it is worth to stress the fact that the mean of 
CT_Financing – being, recall, according to the economic literature, a factor contributing 
to the problems of leverage of the firms – hides an interesting heterogeneity. For 
example, the average response of a professional located in a rich AC and working for a 
big consultancy (size of firm is coded=4, such that there work more than 100 
professionals), is 3.3 (i.e., 2.02+0.24+0.26×4), and if she works for a small one (less 
than 15 professionals, and coded=1), is 2.5 (i.e., 2.02+0.24+0.26×1). For those firm 
sizes, the average response is 3.06 and 2.28, respectively. If we assume that big firms 
are advised by big consultancies (more so in rich regions), this would imply that only 
those firms have the opportunity to choose the financing source, and then in the margin 
taxes have an impact on the decisions of big firms. In contrast, small firms might not 
even have the opportunity to choose the financing method, and then taxes do not play 
any role.  
 
3.3. Complexity of the Spanish Tax System (as a Potential Source of Inefficiencies) 
In the previous section, we hypothesized that the opportunities of tax planning might be 
caused by the complexity of the tax system (i.e., loopholes). Thus, complexity indirectly 
                                                          
25 For easiness of interpretation we show the OLS results. However, these do not vary qualitatively if we 
run an ordered probit regression; they are available upon request to the authors.   
11
 
 
generates efficiency losses associated with activities related to tax planning. However, 
complexity might also have a negative direct effect on efficiency as long as it generates 
uncertainty (Giertz, 2012), or should rather say, adds to the intrinsic uncertainty of the 
globalized market economies. That is why we added a set of questions related to the 
complexity of the tax system.  
 
The question reads as follows: Do you think the Spanish Tax System is more Complex 
than 5/10/15/20 Years Ago?
26 The possible reply is Yes (=1) or Not (=0). Independently 
of the benchmark (5, 10, 15 and 20 years ago), the answers are again overwhelmingly: 
they range from 0.87 (in comparison to 5 years ago) to 0.91 (in comparison to 15 years 
ago). That is, it is almost unanimous the opinion that the complexity has risen during 
the last years. Given the existence of an almost unanimous opinion, we are left without 
variation to exploit it econometrically.  
 
However, is this complexity unavoidable, that is, is it due to exogenous factors to the 
legislators? If so, this characteristic of the tax system is a restriction we have to cope 
with. Alternatively, it might be caused by an endogenous action of the legislator within 
the country. We ask then about the causes of this complexity. On the one hand, for each 
potential cause, the individual has to answer again Yes (=1) or Not (=0). On the other 
hand, the causes of complexity are not mutually exclusive. Thus, for a given individual 
the origin of complexity can be due to a mix of several factors. The results are shown in 
Table 4.  
 
[TABLE 4] 
 
With great difference, tax professionals think the origin of complexity is due to 
endogenous factors, and within them, almost 100% of the respondents think the 
continuous changes of the legislation are key as a source of legal uncertainty. In 
contrast, only slightly above 19% of the respondents think the two exogenous factors 
are the cause of the increasing complexity. We have tried to infer whether there are 
some biases in the responses through OLS27 regressions for each cause of complexity, 
being the results shown in Table 5. Nothing interesting emerges, but the response of 
those professionals located in the foral ACs (Basque Country and Navarre). On the one 
hand, albeit only statistically significant at 90% confidence level, they tend to attach a 
lower weight to the continuous modification of the legislative as a cause of complexity. 
This makes sense as foral ACs have their own laws as far as most taxes are concerned. 
On the other hand, being now the estimate much more precisely assessed, the 
assignment of tax power to the rest of ACs has increased the complexity of their 
professional activity. This would merit further research.  
 
[TABLE 5] 
 
3.4. And as a Conclusion: Do (You Think) We Need a Global Reform? 
According to tax professionals, our tax system is inequitable. We cannot know whether 
it is very (in)efficient – as this has many dimensions – but according to them, planning 
                                                          
26 In Spanish, “Considera que el sistema fiscal español es más complejo de lo que era hace 5/10/15 0 20 
años?”. 
27 The results – which are available upon request to the authors – are qualitatively identical if we perform 
binary regressions (logit or probit). 
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is the main reaction of taxpayers in front of taxes. Probably, this is due to the 
complexity, which is confirmed by the survey, being its cause endogenous factors, and 
so addressable as long as there is a political will to change the current status quo. These 
are our main results.  
 
From them, the natural conclusion is that the Spanish Tax System needs a Global 
Reform, and should rather say a Urgent Reform given the state of our economy, and in 
particular, of our Public Finances. Tax professionals share this opinion; in particular, 
87.87% of those surveyed, which is very high as note that probably some of them 
representing the status quo!, as less complexity might mean less billing. The 
econometric exploitation of this response (1=in favor of a reform; 0=otherwise) is 
curious. The OLS28 estimation is shown in Table 6. Although there is unanimity on 
average, there is a big discrepancy between those professionals located in the Foral ACs 
(estimate=0.49, statistically significant) versus those located in the rest of Spain (ceteris 
paribus, the estimate would coincide with the constant). Hence, those professionals 
might fear that a reform could have an impact on the foral regime, and if altruistic they 
may consider that would not be good for the economy of those communities, or if 
selfish they may fear they could lose their professional rents related to the specificity of 
the foral system.   
 
[TABLE 6] 
 
4. Conclusions 
Economic theory argues that real tax systems suffer important deficiencies that might 
reduce the economic welfare of countries. This view is often supported by empirical 
analyses. Therefore, the conclusion is that there is scope for more equitable, efficient 
and simple tax systems. But, what do tax professionals working in the private sector 
believe according to their professional experience? Given their precise knowledge of the 
fiscal system due to their daily practice, their opinion should be a complementary 
source of information to the theoretical and empirical analyses. 
 
The results from a survey among tax professionals working all over Spain are quite 
conclusive and we can draw three main conclusions. First, the Spanish tax system as a 
whole is considered to be regressive. Second, as far as efficiency is concerned, most 
distortions are related to tax avoidance and tax planning or to mobility. Third, 
complexity has risen during the last years, being the main cause the continuous change 
of the rule. Consequently, and as a final conclusion, the Spanish tax system requires a 
global reform.  
 
 
                                                          
28 The results – which are available upon request to the authors – are qualitatively identical if we perform 
binary regressions (logit or probit). 
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Table 1: Inheritance tax in Andalusia and Madrid: possible situations 
Heir 
Wealth 
transferred value 
Deductions 
Andalusia:  
tax liability 
(1) 
Madrid:  
tax liability 
(2) 
Difference:  
Andalusia – Madrid 
(3) = (1) – (2) 
   € € € 
Effective rate 
(%) 
Child 
500,000 €,  
of which 75% is a 
dwelling 
Eligible for 
permanent residence 
and relationship 
74,958 748 74,210  14.41 
Nephew 
Only relationship. 
Not eligible for 
permanent residence  
182,671 179,131 3,540 0.69 
Child 
500,000 € in bank 
accounts and 
securities 
Only relationship 
122,489 1,104 121,385 23.57 
Nephew 182,671 179,131 3,540 0.69 
Child 
1,000,000 € in 
business assets 
Eligible for business 
and relationship 
2,045 68 1,977 0.19 
Nephew 4,538 12,631 -8,093 -0.79 
Child 
1,000,000 € in bank 
accounts and 
securities 
Only relationship 
286,285 2,728 283,557 27.53 
Nephew 459,294 437,527 21,767 2.11 
Note: Tax liability is assessed considering all deceased’s wealth is transferred to a single heir, which according to law has to add 3% of total wealth as household furnishings.  
The coefficient reflecting the heir’s previous wealth is considered to be 1 in all cases. 
Madrid foresees 99% tax credit for spouses, descendants and ascendants. 
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Table 2: Importance of distortions in the Spanish Tax System 
Variable Observations Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max General assessment 
PIT_Legal 
Structure 
272 3.379 0.778 1 4  
GREAT 
AGREEMENT 
 
CT_Planning 272 3.316 0.756 1 4 
PIT_Housing 272 3.051 1.000 1 4 
CT_Legal 
Structure 
272 2.923 0.928 1 4  
 
PARTIAL 
AGREEMENT 
CT_Country 272 2.710 0.976 1 4 
PIT_Residence 272 2.632 0.963 1 4 
CT_Financing 272 2.426 0.934 1 4 
CT_Investment 272 2.404 0.858 1 4 
PIT_Assets (*) 272 2.312 0.858 1 4 
VAT_Non-
Neutral(*) 
272 1.423 0.934 1 4 FULL 
DISAGREEMENT 
(*): in these cases, we ask about the neutrality; so a high value of it implies a high level 
of neutrality. We then recode the answer as “4-original answer” in order to be 
comparable with the rest of items shown in the Table.  
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Table 3: Analysis of Biases in the Responses Related to Distortions 
 
VARIABLES PIT_Legal 
Structure 
PIT_Residence PIT_Housing PIT_Assets VAT_Neutral CIT_Financing CIT_Investment CIT_Country CIT_Legal 
Structure 
CIT_Planning 
           
Years of experience 0.1151 0.0775 -0.1410 0.1139 0.0840 -0.0636 -0.0637 0.0582 0.0177 -0.0024 
 (0.100) (0.125) (0.128) (0.111) (0.117) (0.118) (0.110) (0.123) (0.119) (0.098) 
Age -0.0177** -0.0010 -0.0015 -0.0151* -0.028*** 0.0010 -0.0080 -0.0167* -0.0123 0.0008 
 (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) 
Sex -0.1001 0.0007 0.0528 0.0117 -0.2227 0.0125 -0.1044 0.0193 -0.1160 -0.1680 
 (0.149) (0.186) (0.190) (0.165) (0.175) (0.175) (0.164) (0.184) (0.178) (0.146) 
Level of studies -0.0054 -0.1704 0.0471 -0.1789* -0.1350 0.1539 -0.0265 0.3251*** 0.1058 0.0876 
 (0.087) (0.110) (0.112) (0.097) (0.103) (0.103) (0.097) (0.108) (0.105) (0.086) 
Professional status 0.0432 -0.0054 0.0034 -0.0295 0.1711* -0.0571 0.0247 0.0446 -0.1135 -0.0944 
 (0.075) (0.094) (0.096) (0.083) (0.088) (0.088) (0.083) (0.093) (0.090) (0.074) 
Size of the firm -0.0703 0.0659 -0.325*** -0.0037 -0.0952 0.2603*** 0.1312 -0.1317 -0.0971 0.0580 
 (0.083) (0.104) (0.106) (0.092) (0.098) (0.098) (0.092) (0.103) (0.100) (0.082) 
AC_average_income -0.0589 -0.0092 -0.0893 0.0799 0.1695 0.3167** 0.2129 -0.0142 -0.1095 -0.0248 
 (0.136) (0.171) (0.174) (0.151) (0.160) (0.160) (0.151) (0.168) (0.163) (0.134) 
AC_high_income -0.1912* 0.0279 -0.0111 0.0254 0.0305 0.2378* 0.0231 0.0309 -0.1018 -0.0475 
 (0.111) (0.139) (0.141) (0.123) (0.130) (0.130) (0.122) (0.137) (0.132) (0.109) 
Foral AC 0.0244 -0.1569 -0.2523 0.0831 -0.0326 -0.1503 0.1115 -0.2068 0.0870 0.0993 
 (0.229) (0.287) (0.292) (0.254) (0.269) (0.269) (0.253) (0.283) (0.273) (0.225) 
Constant 3.9326*** 2.7385*** 3.8818*** 2.5407*** 2.2957*** 2.0182*** 2.8398*** 2.5231*** 4.0316*** 3.6198*** 
 (0.492) (0.617) (0.628) (0.546) (0.577) (0.579) (0.544) (0.607) (0.587) (0.483) 
Observations 272 272 272 272 272 272 272 272 272 272 
R-squared 0.042 0.016 0.054 0.024 0.083 0.079 0.036 0.070 0.039 0.020 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4: Origin of Complexity: Exogenous & Endogenous Factors 
Variable Observations Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
ENDOGENOUS FACTORS 
     
Continuous Change of the Tax Law 272 0.982 0.135 0 1 
Interpretation of the Law by the 
Administration 
272 0.684 0.466 0 1 
Deficient Writing of the Tax Law 272 0.614 0.488 0 1 
Tax Assignment to the ACs 272 0.408 0.492 0 1 
EXOGENOUS FACTORS 
Internationalization of the Economy and 
Mobility of Tax Bases 
272 0.191 0.394 0 1 
Increasing Complexity of the Functioning 
of the Markets 
272 0.191 0.394 0 1 
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Table 5: Analysis of Biases in the Responses Related to the Causes of Complexity 
 
VARIABLES Deficient 
Writing 
of the 
Tax Law 
Continuous 
Change of 
the Tax 
Law 
Interpretation 
of the Law by 
the  
Administration 
 Tax 
Assignment 
to the ACs 
Internationalization 
of the Economy 
Increasing 
Complexity 
of the 
Markets 
        
Years of experience -0.0669 0.0268 0.0389  0.0465 -0.0598 -0.0309 
 (0.062) (0.017) (0.060)  (0.063) (0.051) (0.051) 
Age 0.0067 -0.0020 -0.0039  -0.0030 -0.0004 0.0058 
 (0.005) (0.001) (0.005)  (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Sex -0.0228 0.0506* -0.0455  0.0785 0.0311 -0.0252 
 (0.092) (0.026) (0.090)  (0.094) (0.076) (0.076) 
Level of studies -0.0347 0.0008 0.0128  0.0695 0.0176 0.0426 
 (0.054) (0.015) (0.053)  (0.056) (0.045) (0.045) 
Professional status 0.0830* -0.0019 0.0592  0.0597 -0.0198 -0.0214 
 (0.047) (0.013) (0.045)  (0.048) (0.038) (0.038) 
Size of the firm 0.1153** 0.0073 0.0732  0.0243 0.0189 0.0027 
 (0.052) (0.014) (0.050)  (0.053) (0.042) (0.043) 
AC_average_income -0.0678 -0.0128 -0.0409  0.0263 -0.0194 -0.1075 
 (0.084) (0.024) (0.082)  (0.086) (0.069) (0.070) 
AC_high_income 0.0862 0.0100 -0.1012  -0.0390 0.0399 -0.0292 
 (0.069) (0.019) (0.067)  (0.070) (0.056) (0.057) 
Foral AC -0.2437* 0.0161 -0.0346  0.3308** 0.1229 0.0341 
 (0.142) (0.040) (0.138)  (0.145) (0.117) (0.117) 
Constant 0.0793 0.9386*** 0.4406  -0.1458 0.3995 0.0677 
 (0.305) (0.085) (0.297)  (0.312) (0.251) (0.252) 
Observations 272 272 272  272 272 272 
R-squared 0.063 0.032 0.026  0.036 0.028 0.021 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6: Analysis of Biases in the Responses Related to the Need of a Global Tax Reform 
 
 
VARIABLES Need of a Tax Reform 
  
Years of experience 0.0066 
 (0.041) 
Age 0.0011 
 (0.003) 
Sex -0.0020 
 (0.061) 
Level of studies -0.0283 
 (0.036) 
Professional status -0.0049 
 (0.031) 
Size of the firm 0.0081 
 (0.034) 
AC_average_income -0.0411 
 (0.056) 
AC_high_income -0.0387 
 (0.045) 
Foral AC -0.4329*** 
 (0.094) 
Constant 0.9260*** 
 (0.201) 
Observations 272 
R-squared 0.091 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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